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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs brought an inverse condemnation action to recover
the value of property taken by the State and for severance
damages to their remaining property,
DISPOSITION BELOW
On special verdict, the jury awarded Plaintiffs $289.00 for
the value of the property taken; $578.00 for a temporary construction easement and severance damages in the amount of
$4,543.00.

Judgement for the Plaintiffs totaled $5,410.00.

Plaintiffs1 motion for additur or in the alternative for a new
trial was denied.

Plaintiffs appealed.
JURISDICTION

Appeal is from a final judgment.

The Utah Supreme Court has

jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1987).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Court err in excluding Plaintiffs1 evidence

concerning the measure of damages?
2.

Did the Court err in admitting evidence of improper

elements of damages?
3.

Did the Court err in failing to give Plaintiffs'

requested Jury instructions?
4.

Was the verdict supported by substantial evidence?

5.

Should the Trial Court have granted a new trial on the

grounds that the Jury misapprehended and misapplied the law
concerning valuation of severance damages?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs, the MacQueens, purchased the subject property
located at 3725 Redwood Road in 1971.

(T-4)

The MacQueens have

operated "The Carpet Barn", a retail carpet and floor covering
outlet, on the property since that time.

3ji. At all times prior

to the taking, The Carpet Barn and its customers traveling north
or south on Redwood Road had unrestricted access along the entire
192 foot frontage of The Carpet Barn property.

(Exhibit P-2)

Prior to the taking, there had been no effort to restrict or
regulate access to Plaintiffs' property, or to prevent customers
from utilizing the State's right-of-way in entering and exiting.
The portion of the Plaintiffs1 property fronting Redwood
Road contained space for fifteen to twenty parking spaces that
were used by The Carpet Barn's customers.

(T-ll)

The only

customer entrance to the building was located in the front of the
building immediately adjacent to the customer parking.
During 1984, the State of Utah, (hereinafter "State")
entered into negotiations with Plaintiffs to acquire a 3-foot by
approximately 192-foot strip along the entire frontage of Plaintiffs' property.

(T-14)

When Plaintiffs refused the State's

initial offer, plans were altered to proceed with the road
widening without acquiring Plaintiffs' property.

(T-20, T-74)

In the spring of 1985 the State began construction of a retaining
wall across the front of Plaintiffs' property.

(T-15)

The wall

ranged in height from approximately 16 inches to 2 feet and was
-9-

topped by a 4-foot high chain-link fence.

(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit

It encroached on Plaintiffs1 property approximately six

25)

inches.

(T-292)

The only access to Plaintiffs1 property was

through a 20-foot opening in the curb, wall and fence on the
southwest corner of the property.

(T-96)

ment for commercial driveways is 25 feet.
ment is set forth by the State.

The minimum require(T-95)

This require-

(T-23)

The construction of the wall and fence prevented parking in
front of the property, eliminating approximately 15 to 20 parking
spaces.

The fence and wall also restricted access to Plaintiffs'

automatic sprinkler system in violation of West Valley City Fire
Code.

(T-102)

The chain-link fence was removed by the State prior to
trial.

(T-34)

The trial court ruled that since the fence had

been removed, Plaintiffs were prevented from introducing evidence
regarding the fence.

(T-33-34)

The Trial Court also prevented

Plaintiffs from presenting evidence of the size and type of
access allowed other property owners which was offered to show
that the access allowed Plaintiffs was unreasonable and adversely
affected the value of their remaining property.

(T-337-340)

The Trial Court, over Plaintiffs1 objection, allowed the
State's appraiser, Mr. Lang, to present evidence regarding flcost
to cure."

Part of this evidence included a figure of $4,543.00

for landscaping the front of Plaintiffs1 building.

-1-

(T-294)

There was no "landscaping1' involved in the taking, nor any
landscaping on the property at any time prior to the taking.
(T-293)
Plaintiffs took exception to the deletion of language in
Plaintiffs1 proposed instruction nos. 28 and 25 which instructed
the jury that long use could establish an easement in favor of
the abutting property owner for use of the right-of-way.

(T-341)

Plaintiffs also took exception to the failure to give Plaintiffs1
proposed instruction No. 26 regarding Plaintiffs1 unrestricted
access to the property prior to the taking.

(T-342)

The court

also refused to instruct the jury to ignore the State's evidence
regarding "cost to cure.11

(T-344)

The jury was instructed that Plaintiffs1 property had been
taken.

(Instruction No. 11)

The Jury found that there were

severance damages to the remaining property not taken; however,
the amount of severance damages awarded was the precise amount
the State's appraiser testified he thought would be necessary to
landscape the front of the property.

(T-294)

Plaintiffs filed a motion for additur or in the alternative
for a new trial based on the jury's failure to follow the law in
applying the proper formula to calculate severance damages.
motion was denied.

The

Plaintiffs appealed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The jury misapplied the law in the valuation of severance
damages.

This is evidenced by the fact that the verdict given is
-4-

not supported by the evidence received at trial.

Several evi-

dentiary rulings erroneously excluded evidence offered by
Plaintiffs and admitted evidence offered by the Defendants contributing to the jury's error.

The failure to give Plaintiffs'

instructions as requested precluded a fair consideration of
Plaintiffs1 "theory of the case" regarding calculation of severance damages.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek an Order:
1.

Remanding the case for recomputation of severance

damages according to the proper legal standard;
2.

Reversing the lower court's evidentiary rulings as

outlined herein; and
3.

Reversing the Court's ruling on

Plaintiffs' requested

jury instructions.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE JURY FAILED TO FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS
WITH REGARD TO CALCULATION OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES.
The jury was instructed as to the proper method to be used
to calculate severance damages.

Instruction No. 15, in relevant

part read:
You shall consider the value of the remaining
property before the severance of the part
acquired and, second, the value of the
-5-

remaining property after severance. If the
value of the remaining property after the
taking is less than the value before the
taking this reduction in value is to be
considered as severance damages.
This instruction translates into a very simple formula that can
be expressed as: value before (x) - value after (y) = severance
damages (d).
In order for the jury to properly award severance damages in
the amount of $4,543.00 there must be some competent evidence
presented at trial which established that the portion of the
property not taken decreased in value $4,543.00 by virtue of the
taking.

A thorough review of the evidence presented at trial

discloses no evidence which, when properly used to establish
before and after values of the subject property, could support
the verdict reached by the jury.
Plaintiffs, through the testimony of their expert appraiser,
Mr. Blankenship, established that the value of the property
before the taking was $225,684.00.

The Plaintiffs1 expert

testified that by the taking of Plaintiffs1 property and construction of a wall, the "highest and best use of the property
was changed, due to the lack of access and parking in front of
the property, from commercial to light industrial.11

He testified

that as a result the value of the property, after the taking, was
$88,905.00.

(T-185)

Thus, had the jury adopted the view of the

evidence presented by Plaintiffs, severance damages would be
calculated:

$225,684.00 - $88,905.00 = $137,778.00.

Defendants1 appraiser valued the property before the taking
at $306,000.00, i.e. $80,316.00 higher than the value given by
Plaintiffs.

Then, rather than testifying as to the proper value

of the property after the taking, Defendants1 expert testified
that the property, because of the taking, suffered from
"functional obsolescence11; that is, the property was no longer
functional for its purpose as a commercial establishment.
(T-289)

The main factor in making this determination was that

there could no longer be parking in front of the building (id).
In order to solve the problem of "functional obsolescence," the
State's appraiser testified that Plaintiffs would have to tear
down a portion of their building to provide additional access and
parking.

(Id.)

His estimated cost to tear down the existing

portion of the structure and convert it to parking was
$25,000.00.

He testified it would cost $98,000.00 to replace the

space lost by destruction of the building.

However, when asked

what value he assigned to the property after the taking, he
replied as follows:
Q.

In light of those facts, on what value then did you

assign to the property after the taking in question?
A.

I had one other thought.

should be cleaned up.

I thought that the front

There's a space between this right-of-way

line and the building now, which is unusable space. He was using
that space before for parking.

There's some asphalt on it, some

concrete on it, and there's some gravel on it.
-7-

That doesn't

appeal to the use -- that isn't appealing from a retail use of
this property.

So I thought that that should be planted.

We

talked to a landscaping contractor at Redwood Road Nursery, and
with his help we came up with the sprinkling system, some not too
tall of greens, some low of greens, some ground cover, etc.,
soil, removing the asphalt, and removing the concrete so that
this area in between the right-of-way line and the building could
be landscaped in some way that he wouldn't have to mow a lawn or
do something that took a lot of maintenance over the years, and
improve the look out in the front there.
that was $4,543.00.

And our estimate for

So we have, then, curing the front yard

appearance, $4,543.00, a taking at $3.00 a square foot, 6 inches
wide, comes to $2.89-Q.

Excuse me.

your testimony.

Let me fill in this chart with respect to

Going back to the before value of the land that

was $211,000; is that correct?
A.

Roughly.

Q.

The value utilized was $95,000?

A.

That's right.

Q.

For a total value before of $306,000; is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now let's talk about the value of the land actually

taken.

You've assumed, I guess, a 6 inch taking along the entire

frontage of the property?
A.

Yes, that's about 96 square foot.
-8-

Q.

And you utilized your figure of $3.00 a square foot?

A.

$3.00.

Q.

What did you determine when you mentioned the landscap-

A.

You want the number?

Q.

$4,543.00?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you make a determination of the value of a

We rounded it to $2.89.

ing?

temporary easement during the course of completion of the improvements?
A.

Yes.

I felt that a 10 foot wide strip was probably

utilized there, took the fee simple value of that, assumed that
it was occupied for a year by the contractor, although it was
probably less, and took 10 percent rent, which is a land rent
from the market place, and that came to $578.00 rent.

(T-295)

The figures returned by the jury, as evidenced by the
special verdict form, are the figures as testified to above by
Defendants1 witness.

Those figures included the cost of the land

taken, cost of the construction easement, but not the difference
in value of the property before and after taking, nor even the
total "cost to cure11 as testified by Defendants' experts
($25,000.00 + $98,000.00 + $4,543.00 = $127,543.00), but the
figure listed was only the cost for "curing the front yard
appearance."

(T-294)

Defendants did not testify, nor did they contend that the
$4,543.00 represents the difference between the value of the
property before the taking minus the value after the taking.
There was no testimony to which the jury could have applied the
formula x (value before) - y (value after) = d (severance damages) which would have yielded the result reached.

Where the

jury so clearly misapprehends or misapplies the law, Plaintiffs
are entitled to a new trial.

Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin,

17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615 (1966).
II.
THE JURY VERDICT IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
Since Defendants offered no direct testimony to establish
the "after" value, the only evidence before the Jury on the
"after" value was
$88,905.00.

that presented by Plaintiffs1

expert,

The "before" values given were $306,000.00 by the

State and $225,684.00 by the Plaintiffs.

In order for the

verdict to be within the range of testimony offered at trial, it
must fall within $217,095.00

($306,000.00 value before -

$88,905.00 value after) and $137,778.00 ($225,864.00 value before
- $88,905.00 value after).

Thus, the verdict returned by the

Jury, $5,410.00, it is not within the range of testimony
provided.
In eminent domain cases, absent a showing of
passion or prejudice, if the award of compensation was within the estimate of value given
by one of the expert witnesses, it is supported by competent evidence and will be
affirmed.
-10-

Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d 103 (Utah 1984).
In determining whether the jury verdict falls

,f

within the esti-

mates of value given by one of the experts" the New Mexico
Supreme Court in City of Albuquerque v. Chapman, 76 N.M. 162, 413
P.2d 204 (1966) stated:
[0]pinion by real estate appraisers on
"before and after" market values must be
considered in connection with related facts
on which they are based, and a satisfactory
explanation must be given as to how the
witness arrived at his conclusion.
Id. at 208 (citing Arkansas State Highway ComirTn v. Ptak, 236
Ark. 105, 364 S.W.2d 794 (1963)).

In Chapman the court reversed

a verdict based on the testimony of an appraiser who based his
conclusion on inaccurate dimensions and calculations and undeveloped reasoning.

In this case, the State's appraiser, as a basis

for valuing the property the same both before and after the
taking (T-280) stated that he relied on Mr. Beaufort, another
state witness who had told him that the Plaintiffs did not have
access across the frontage of the property prior to the taking.
(T-315)

He admitted that his appraisal would change if the

assumption that Plaintiffs, prior to the taking did not have
unrestricted access along the front of their property, was
incorrect.

He further admitted the entirety of his appraisal was

based on that fact.

(T-316)

The appraiser, Mr. Lang, also

admitted that if his assumption was incorrect then his appraisal
was also incorrect.

Id.

Mr. Beaufort, upon whose representation Mr. Lang had based
his entire appraisal, was asked on cross-examination:
Q:

Do you know of any law, any regulation, any directive,
that says that a customer of the Carpet Barn parking in
20 feet of property can't back out onto Redwood Road
and proceed North or South over the State1s right-ofway?

A:

If its transversable, I believe there is--there is
transversable. [sic]

There is no law that says you

cannot do that.
(T-256)

The exhibits submitted at trial show the condition of

the property with unrestricted access prior to the taking. Mr.
MacQueen testified that prior to the taking, customers had access
all along the front of the property for parking.

(T-6)

The

State presented no evidence to support the assumption upon which
Mr. Lang's testimony was based.

Mr. Beaufort, whose hearsay

communication allegedly formed the basis of Mr. Lang's testimony,
gave testimony at trial inconsistent with the out-of-court
statement relied on by Lang.

Before testimony of an appraiser

can support a jury verdict the facts upon which it is based must
be examined to determine if they support his conclusion.
City of Albuquerque v. Chapman, 413 P.2d at 208.

See

In this case,

the entire basis for Mr. Lang's conclusion was a hearsay statement that was contradicted in court by the declarant of the
statement and which was unsupported by any other evidence.

The factual basis for Lang's calculation of the property
taken and the construction easement are also lacking.

As to the

amount of property actually taken he testified:
Well, there was a taking of approximately 6 inches in front,
I'm told by others.

I didn't measure it myself. (T-292)

His testimony as to the value of the construction easement is
based on unfounded assumptions and is entirely lacking in foundation:
0.

Did you make a determination of the value of a construction easement during the course of completion of
the improvements?

A.

Yes.

I felt that a 10 foot wide strip was probably

utilized there, took the fee simple value of that,
assumed that it was occupied for a year by the contractor, although it was probably less, and took 10 percent
rent, which is a land rent from the market place, and
that came to $528.00 rent.
(T-295)

The figures given by the State's appraiser were

based on speculation and hearsay rather than on personal knowledge.

The methods used to calculate damage included improper

speculative elements of damages such as landscaping, which did
not properly figure into the value of the property after the
taking.

Therefore, this case is analogous to Chapman.

The

testimony of the State's appraiser is incapable of supporting the
jury verdict.
-13-

III.
THE JURY RELIED ON AN IMPROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The testimony of Defendant's appraiser as to the severance
damages was also based on undeveloped reasoning regarding cost to
cure rather than a calculation of value prior to the taking minus
the value after the taking.

The measure of severance damages

proposed by Defendant, and adopted by the jury, was not only
unreasoned, but was an improper measure of damages.
In Board of Trustees v. B.J. Services, Inc., 75 M.M. 459,
406 P.2d 171 (1965), there was evidence offered regarding installation of improvements to the property.

The New Mexico court,

noting that the trial court considered improper elements of
damages rather than applying the before and after rule, reversed
the trial court stating:
[I]t is proper to consider the cost of
improvements for restoration purposes and
relocation costs as helpful aids in determining the difference in the before and after
value of the property. However, such prospective expenditures are not, themselves,
proper elements of damage.
Id. at 172 (citing Arkansas State Highway ComnTn v. Speck, 230
Ark. 712, 324 S.W.2d 796 (1959); Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v.
Ptak, 236 Ark. 105, 364 S.W.2d 794 (1963); 4 Nichols on Eminent
Domain p. 657.)

In reversing the lower court the New Mexico

Supreme Court stated: "Lacking essential findings on the before

and after values of the property as a whole, the decision cannot
stand."

Iji. at 173.

In the case at bar, the jury's findings of

$4,543.00 in severance damages cannot stand since it was not
based on any determination of the value of the property prior and
subsequent to the taking, but reflected only the cost of
improving the front of Plaintiffs' property which, by itself, is
not a proper measure of damages.

Board of Trustees v. B.J.

Services, Inc., 406 P.2d at 172.
In Utah Dep't of Transportation v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481
(Utah 1979) , this Court reversed an earlier line of cases to
eradicate the kind of error brought about by the kind of testimony offered by Defendants in this case.

In Rayco the State

condemned a 60-foot strip to widen 12th Street in Ogden and
provide a drainage easement.

The taking resulted in the loss of

more than 50^ of the prime parking directly in front of a supermarket.

As a result, the business was transformed into a non-

conforming use and the supermarket building was a misplaced
improvement, there being insufficient parking to conduct that
kind of business. The State put on evidence that to correct the
situation the supermarket should buy an additional piece of
property and transform it into parking to replace the space lost
in the taking.

The State's estimate of severance damages, which

was adopted by the jury, was based on the cost of acquiring
additional land and transforming the area to the side of Plaintiffs' building into parking.

The trial court assessed damages according to the State's
evidence of the "cost to cure."
Court stated:

In reversing the decision this

"The proper measure of severance damages to the

remainder is the difference between the fair cash market value
before and after the taking."

JA.

at 489 (citing State v.

Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 321, 366 P.2d 76 (1961)).

The

condemnee was not forced to replace his front yard with his back
yard,

599 P.2d at 490.

In rejecting the replacement theory the

court noted that it did not follow the statutory standard set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 since that theory, in effect,
limited damages to the fair market value of the land condemned.
Id. at 487.
The testimony offered by the State in this case was nearly
identical to that rejected by the court in Rayco.

In this case

the taking eliminated all Plaintiffs1 prime parking in front of
his building, thus making his building unfit for its purpose as a
retail establishment, making it in effect, a "misplaced improvement," or a non-conforming use of the property.

The State

offered testimony that Plaintiffs could acquire additional
parking to remedy the situation by tearing down a portion of
their building and creating a parking lot along one side.

Then

almost as an afterthought, the State added the cost of landscaping the front of the building.

However, unlike Rayco, the

State listed only the cost of landscaping as the total severance
damages caused by the taking.

The measure of damages offered by

the State did not include the entire "cost to cure;" which, if
calculated from the testimony of the State's own expert would include $25,000.00 (to demolish the existing structure and convert
it to parking) plus $98,000.00 (to replace on Plaintiffs1 own
property the portion of the structure demolished) plus $4,543.00
(to plant "some not too tall of greens, some low of greens, some
ground cover, etc.n) for a total of $127,534.00.

Thus, even if

the court were to allow the type of testimony which was rejected
in Rayco, and which was objected to by Plaintiffs in this case;
and even if the jury were to be allowed to calculate damages on a
theory that was not only improper under the facts of the case,
but on which they were not instructed, the award in this casemust be rejected as inadequate and Plaintiffs1 Motion for Additur
should be granted so that Plaintiffs are placed in as good a
financial position as they were in before the taking.

State Road

Comm'n v. Noble, 6 Ut. 2d 40, 305 P.2d 495 (1957).
IV.
THE STATE'S ESTIMATE OF DAMAGES DOES
NOT CONSIDER ALL PROPER ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE
In a case similar to this case, Defnet Land and Investment
Co. v. State, 103 Ariz. 388, 442 P.2d 835 (1968), the Arizona
Supreme Court rejected the testimony of the State's expert, even
though it had not been objected to below stating:

M

0rdinarily,

we would not consider a claim of error where the trial court was
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not given the opportunity to correct the error prior to the
appeal, but the method of evaluation by the appraisers for the
State is so fundamentally unfair and unjust as to permit of no
other conclusion that a retrial of the cause is required."
at 837.

Id.

In Defnet, the condemneefs property had 2,000 feet of

direct access to the highway.

The State took a strip along the

front of Plaintiff's property and fenced him off from the highway.

This changed the highest and best use of the property from

commercial to residential.

The State's expert testified that the

property was not damaged by fencing off the right-of-way since,
although the access was different, he believed it was adequate
for its purpose as residential property.

The Arizona Court,

after recognizing that loss of access was a damage to property
that must be compensated, stated:
If the substantial access was adequate for
the land's highest and best use as homesites
after the taking, this does not answer the
fundamental question which the jury had to
resolve-that is, what was the market value of
the property after the taking measured by its
highest and best use as if it had the same
access which it had prior to the taking. We
are compelled to agree that the basic concept
of the State's measure of damages is wholly
incorrect and its acceptance by the jury can
be nothing less than fundamental error.
Id. at 838.

In the case at bar the State's appraiser likewise

testified that the property was not damaged by the change in
access since the 20-foot driveway provided "adequate access."
Yet his testimony did not take into consideration that the
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"highest and best use" of the property, which before had been
commercial, had been changed by the taking of the parking in
front of the building to something less than commercial according
to the State (T-277-78) or to
Plaintiffs' expert.

ff

light industrial11 according to

(T-159) The State's evidence was contradic-

tory, while it was testified that there was no damage

resulting

from the change of access, Mr. Beauford, one of the State's
witness, testified that the access was "unreasonable" (T-285) and
the State's appraiser testified that the building was no longer
fit for its purpose as a retail establishment.

(T-288-89)

The measure of damages suggested by the State included
improper factors, such as the cost to landscape and the cost to
create additional parking.

Proper elements of damage such as the

loss of access and change in the highest and best use were
ignored.
Severance damages must be determined by considering the
"highest and best use" of the property.

Deprivation of access is

a factor that must be considered in calculation of those damages.
See Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974).
The evidence offered by the State as to the cost to landscape the
property was not a proper measure of damages.

The methodology

used by Defendants' appraiser to calculate damages was specifically rejected by this court in Rayco.

Therefore, the measure

used by the State's expert to determine damage was "wholly
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incorrect and its acceptance by the jury can be nothing less than
fundamental error."

Rayco, 442 P.2d at 838,
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GIVE PLAINTIFFS1 REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS
The failure to give portions of Plaintiffs1 Instructions No.
25 and 28, as well as failure to give Plaintiffs1 Instruction No.
26, prevented the jury from considering the Plaintiffs1 theory on
valuation of severance damages.
The purpose of instructions to the jury is to
inform them as to the law applicable to the
evidence and enable them to resolve the
issues in dispute. To that end, what each
party is entitled to is to have instructions
given as to his evidence and his theory of
the case.
Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980).
Plaintiffs1 theory of the case, as represented by the
testimony of their expert witnesses, was that the Carpet Barn
property, prior to the taking, had storefront parking along the
entire length of the property.

Access to this parking on Plain-

tiffs' property was unrestricted at all points along the entire
frontage of the property.

Therefore, the proper method for the

jury to calculate severance damages was to find the value of the
property at its highest and best use in the condition it was in
prior to the taking, that is, with storefront parking and unrestricted access; then, to find the value of the property at the
highest and best use after the taking.
-20-

Plaintiffs' proposed

Instruction No. 26 read: "You are instructed that the evidence in
this case is that the State of Utah did not attempt, in any way,
to restrict highway access of the Carpet Barn property until
August, 1985."

This instruction was necessary to give the jury a

starting point to calculate severance damages under Plaintiffs1
theory of the case.

This instruction was also necessary for the

jury to properly utilize Instructions Nos. 18, 20 and 21 which
read:
Instruction No. 18:
You are instructed that the law recognizes
that a landowner whose property fronts on a
public highway has a right of reasonable
access to the highway.
Instruction No. 20:
The State has authority to adopt and enforce
regulations governing the use of and access
to public highway rights of way, including
regulations governing the location, number
and width of driveways providing access to
and from adjoining land. However, the State
is prohibited by law from exercising this
authority in a way that unreasonably interferes with or impairs an established right of
ingress and egress to property adjoining a
public highway.
Where an owner of adjoining land has
rights of ingress and egress to a public
highway and those rights are unreasonably
impaired by the adoption of State regulations
or the enforcement of those regulations, that
owner is entitled to just compensation by way
of severance damages for the unreasonable
restriction of his right of access.
Instruction No. 21:
The rights of access, light, and air are
easements appurtenant to the land of an
abutting owner on a street; they constitute
property rights forming part of the owner's
estate. These substantial property rights,

although subject to reasonable regulation,
may not be taken away or unreasonably impaired by the State without the payment of
just compensation.
Where, in connection with an actual taking
of an abutting property owner's property, the
erection of a permanent structure as a part
of a public highway results in the impairment
of or damage to the abutting property owner's
easements of access, light, and air, that
damage or impairment are relevant factors
properly considered in determining severance
damages.
Without Plaintiffs1 proffered Instruction No. 26, the jury
had no starting point from which to calculate damages.

Without

guidance as to what Plaintiffs1 rights were prior to the taking
there is no way that the jury can properly calculate the effect
the taking had upon those rights and, as they were instructed to
do, utilize this as a factor in calculating severance damages.
This error was compounded by the exclusion of Plaintiffs1
evidence regarding the access allowed other businesses in the
area to establish what a reasonable restriction of access would
amount to.

The net result was that although the jury was in-

structed to calculate damages based on the use of the property
before and after the taking, they were given no guidance as to
what Plaintiffs' rights were prior to the taking and no basis for
comparison as to what their access rights would be following a
"reasonable restriction."

Therefore, the key element of Plain-

tiffs' damage, the change in the highest and best use of the
property after restriction of its access and the elimination of
its storefront parking, was not properly presented to the jury

for consideration.

This problem was exacerbated by the court's

elimination of language in Plaintiffs1 proffered Instructions
Nos. 25 and 28 which indicated that Plaintiffs1 rights to access
and easement for light, air and access, could be "established by
long term use or travel."

(Compare instructions as given with

Plaintiffs' proffered instructions (Addendum pages 1, 2))
The effect of the elimination of this language was not only
to deny Plaintiffs1 instructions as to their "theory of the case"
but also to deny them the full benefit they were entitled to from
the instructions that were given.
Jury instructions must be read as a whole.
McKnight, 562 P.2d 623 (Utah 1977).

Black v.

Although the portions of the

instructions not given were not of great length, they, along with
Instruction No. 26 were critical to Plaintiffs1 theory of the
case.

The failure to give Plaintiffs1 Instructions Nos. 25, 26

and 28 as requested made it impossible for the jury to properly
apply Instructions Nos. 18, 20, 21 and 22 regarding calculation
of damages.
Plaintiffs1 right to have the jury instructed as to their
theory of the case is well recognized.

Elkington v. Foust, 618

P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Powers v. Gene's Building Materials, Inc.,
567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977); State Bank of Beaver County v.
Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P.2d. 612 (1933).

In the instant

case the instructions, when taken as a whole, lacked the critical
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elements to properly place Plaintiffs1 theory of the case before
the jury.
VI.
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY
ON IMPROPER ELEMENTS OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES.
The case at bar presented the jury with two very narrow
issues to determine;

first, the value of the land taken, and

second, the damages to the remaining property.
No. 9.

See Instruction

The jury was instructed to determine the value of the

land before the taking and the value of the land subsequent to
the taking.

The difference in these amounts, the reduction in

the value of the property as a result of the taking, was to be
considered severance damages.

See Instruction No. 15.

The

evidence objected to by Plaintiffs concerned the cost to landscape the portion of Plaintiffs1 property that they had previously used as parking.

M

Such prospective expenditures are not,

themselves, proper elements of damage.11

Board of Trustees v. B.

J. Services, Inc., 75 N.M. 459, 406 P.2d 171 (1965).
It was error for the Court to allow Defendants to offer
testimony which went to an improper element of damage.

Under the

only theory of damages on which the jury was instructed, x (value
before) - y (value after) = d (severance damages), the evidence
of landscaping had no place in the equation.
to the value prior to the taking.

It was not relevant

It was not used in determining

the value after the taking, but, as shown from the testimony of
the State's appraiser (T-294) was offered and calculated as an
element of damage.

This error was prejudicial.

An error in the

admission of evidence is prejudicial when it impacts the outcome
of the case. Hillyard v. Utah By-products, Co., 1 Utah 2d 143,
263 P.2d 287 (1953).
The testimony received in error improperly listed landscaping as an element of damage.
listed was $4,543.00 (T-294).

The value of this element

The amount of severance damages

found by the jury was $4,543.00.

One need not invade the

sanctity of the jury's deliberations to conclude that the evidence erroneously received impacted the decision to the prejudice
of Plaintiffs.
VII.
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE
OF THE CHAIN LINK FENCE
The State, in constructing the retaining wall which encroached on Plaintiffs' property, included a chain link fence on
top of the wall which prevented access to Plaintiffs' property at
any point outside of the 20-foot drive strip.
was removed by the State prior to trial.

(T-36)

(T-34)

The fence

In calculating

Plaintiffs' severance damages using the before and after method,
Plaintiffs are entitled to show the value of the property at its
highest and best use as of the date of the taking.
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United States

v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1942), Reh den 318 U.S. 798 (1943); See
generally 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain §152 (1966).
In this case Plaintiffs were denied this opportunity to
present evidence regarding the fence and the negative impact it
had on the value of their property.

(T-34)

As a result, they

were not placed in as good a financial position as they would
have been had there had been no taking.

State Road Comm'n v.

Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40, 305 P.2d 495 (1957).

The exclusion of this

evidence denied the Plaintiffs the benefit of having the jury
consider their fullest measure of damages.
were denied "just compensation."

Thus the Plaintiffs

Utah Const. Art. I, §22.

VIII.
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF
ACCESS ALLOWED OTHER COMPARABLE PROPERTIES
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (1987), Plaintiffs are
entitled to damages based on the difference in the value of the
property before and after the taking.

The "reasonableness11 of

the access allowed is relevant only as it affects the value of
the property after the taking.
Plaintiffs offered evidence of the access allowed to other
commercial properties in the vicinity in order to give the jury a
basis to decide whether the access provided Plaintiffs, one
20-foot driveway, was reasonable access for a commercial property.

The Court excluded this evidence, leaving the jury with the

-26-

task of determining what "reasonable access" was with no basis
for comparison.

Plaintiffs were prejudiced by the exclusion

because a major element of severance damage was that the limitation of access changed the highest and best use of the property
from commercial to light industrial.

Without any proper guide-

line to determine what constituted "reasonable access" for
commercial property the jury could not properly determine how the
change in access affected the value of the property.
IX.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ADDITUR
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL
Following the return of the verdict, Plaintiffs moved to
have the Court supplement or set aside the award on the grounds
that the verdict was based on a fundamental misunderstanding or
misapplication of law.

Where it clearly appears that the jury

has refused to accept credible uncontradicted evidence or has
misapplied or ignored the law, it is both the prerogative and the
duty of the Court to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.
Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615
(1966).

In this case, there was no competent evidence received

by the Court which, when properly applied under the instructions
given, would justify the verdict returned by the jury.
The testimony regarding landscaping improvements was not
relevant as to the fair market value of the property and was not
-27-

a proper element to be considered in calculating severance
damages.
172.

Board of Trustees v. B. J. Services, Inc., 406 P.2d at

The fact that the jury found severance damages in an amount

identical to the estimated landscaping costs indicates that the
jury misunderstood the principles of law used in determining
severance damages as set forth in Instruction No. 18 and further,
misapplied that law to the testimony of Mr. Lang regarding
landscaping improvements.
In awarding the landscaping costs as severance damages, the
jury clearly misinterpreted and misapplied the law with regard to
determining severance damages and the trial court should have
corrected the error below by granting a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Several prejudicial errors were made at trial, any one of
which is grounds for reversal.

The exclusion of evidence con-

cerning the chain link fence prevented the jury from considering
the full measure of damages suffered by the Plaintiffs.

Exclu-

sion of evidence regarding the access provided similar commercial
properties prevented any reasoned determination of what effect
the change in access had on the highest and best use of the
property, which was a critical element of Plaintiffs' damages.
The admission of evidence regarding an improper element of
damages, landscaping, led the jury into an improper calculation
of severance

damages.

The

failure

to give Plaintiffs1

instructions as requested prevented the jury from properly considering Plaintiffs1 theory of the case.
The individual and cumulative effect of these errors was the
return of a verdict that was unsupported by any substantial
evidence and which could not have been reached through the proper
application of the law.

Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court

that the verdict of the lower court be reversed and the case
remanded for proper determination of Plaintiffs1
damages.

severance

In the alternative Plaintiffs request a finding that

the only proper evidence offered at trial on the issue of severance damages was that offered by Plaintiffs and that the verdict
be amended to reflect the damages Plaintiffs proved at trial.
Respectfully submitted this

day of July, 1988.
SESSIONS & MOORE

CLARK W. SESSIONS
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of July, 1988, the

foregoing document was served on the Defendants-Respondents by
hand delivering true and correct copies thereof to:
Stephen C. Ward (A3384)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jody K. Burnett (A0499)
SNOW, CFRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents
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Addendum
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25
The State has authority to adopt and enforce regulations
governing the use of and access to public highway rights of way,
including regulations governing the location, number and width of
driveways providing access to and from adjoining land.

However,

the State is prohibited by law from exercising this authority in
a way that unreasonably interferes with or impairs an established
right of ingress and egress to property adjoining a public
highway.
Whereas an owner of adjoining land has rights of ingress and
egress to a public highway established by long-time use or travel
and those rights are unreasonably impaired by the adoption of
State regulations or the enforcement of those regulations, that
owner is entitled to just compensation by way of severance
damages for the unreasonable restriction of his right of access.
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-134
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INSTRUCTION NO. 28

The rights of access, light and air are easements appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute property rights forming part of the owner's estate.

These

substantial property rights, although subject to reasonable
regulation, may not be taken away or impaired by the State
without the payment of just compensation.
Where, in connection with an actual taking of an abutting
property owner's property, the erection of a permanent structure
as a part of a public highway results in the impairment of or
damage to the abutting property owner's easements of access,
light, and air established by long-time travel or use, that
damage or impairment are relevant factors property considered in
determining severance damages.

Utah State Road Commission vs.
Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah
1974);
Utah Road Commission vs.
Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383
P.2d 917 (1963).
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Ms. Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Re:

The Carpet Barn v. State of Utah
Case No. 890315CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
Since our case was briefed, the Court of Appeals decided the
case of Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 751 P.2d 1321 (Utah App.
1988). As this case is factually similar to the case at bench,
Appellants cite it as supplemental authority to its Brief.
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Jody K. Burnett
Anne Swensen
Stephen C. Ward
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